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Attorneys for Appellant 
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Telephone (801) 328-98891 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT E. BARTEAUX, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (a) (1987). This is an appeal from a 
final order of the Utah Industrial Commission, after a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact that the 
appellant intended to take the employer's property and convert it 
to his own use without permission supported by substantial 
evidence? Did the employer meet his burden of proof to show just 
cause for discharge? Was the appellant at fault in the creation 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Administrative Code §§ R475-5b(l) and R475-6e; Utah Code 
SS 35-4-5(b((l), 35-4-6(d) and 63-46b-l et seq. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On August 28, 1989 Robert E. Barteaux was discharged from his 
job as a cashier at Little America. He was granted unemployment 
compensation benefits, and the employer appealed. After a hearing 
before an administrative law judge on September 29, 1989, the 
initial decision was reversed. It was held that the employer had 
just cause for discharge and that the claimant was at fault in 
creating an overpayment. The claimant timely appealed this decision 
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission. On January 16 , 
1990, the Board of Review, in a two to one decision, affirmed the 
determination of the administrative law judge. The claimant then 
timely appealed to this court. 
The discharge was the result of a single incident where the 
claimant moved four small plants having a total value of $6.00 from 
one location on the employer's property to another (Tr. 29). There 
had been no prior disciplinary actions taken against the claimant 
or problems with his performance (Tr. 24). 
The claimant had taken a walk around the employer's large 
property, as he often did, during a work break (Tr. 31-32). He 
again noticed the four small plants which had been sitting in their 
flats for two months (Tr. 31). Originally there had been many flats 
of plants stored there, but most had already been planted (Tr. 23). 
The claimant looked around for a maintenance man to see if he could 
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get permission to hdvi- ui buy the plants,, but he could find no one 
(Tr. 31). So he put the plants in a shoebox ami walked toward the 
fron t of the property. He placed the plants on a fountain and was 
approaching the trout entrance when hi?« wa.« confronted by Mr, 
Stoner, who was in charge of security, M.OIIH'1 lift'I observed the 
claimant picking up the plants and walking toward the front of the 
property , and had rushet intercept him. But the claimant 
no longer was in possession of the plants : •- . <*. -^ lit testified 
thdl he wa'-' quinq in look for someone -^  91 *>e him permission to 
take the plants and had not left them thexr original location 
because he didn't want to hcive to walk <:. i the back *u 1 he l,» IMMII 
parking lot I "Ti: , 32) . 
There is conflicting testimony cone turning whether the claimant 
initially denied knowing where the plants were when confronted by 
SLciiiei: .ri?nl whether the plants were concealed. Stoner stated that 
the claimant initially denied knowing WIMI. 31 oner was talking about 
and that the plants were concealed underneath a bush (Tr. 26). The 
claimaii hat he did not denying knowing where the plants 
were (Tr. :. a*Hj T mat they were c.1 ear] y vi sible (Tr. 32) 
risih of this evidence the administrati ve law judge 
iiiarit intended "to remove the plants from the 
employer's property, and conver t: them 1.0 his own u&e without 
obtaining permission" (Tr. 42) . He held the claimant to be , 
HI ill** ciedliuii 1 1 .ui overpayment because he lied aboir his 
intentions when he applied tor benefit;,' ( 1 -j. | The Hoard of Review# 
while noting that it was "somewhat troubled by the severity of the 
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penalty, for what might be considered a minor infraction" (Tr. 61), 
affirmed. The dissenting board member found that the employer 
overreacted and that termination was not justified (Tr. 62). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether there was just cause for discharge is a 
mixed question of law and fact, and therefore an intermediate 
standard of review is appropriate for this question. Pro-Benefit 
Staffinq. Inc. v. Board of Review. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App. 
1989). The inferences drawn from the operative facts and the 
application of the law to these facts must be reasonable and 
rational. Id. Findings of fact only need by supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Grace Drilling 
Company v. Board of Review. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The employer has the burden of proof to show just cause for 
discharge. That burden was not met in this case. First, there is 
not substantial evidence that the claimant intended to remove the 
plants from the employer's property without permission. Second, 
the actions of the claimant do not constitute just cause for 
discharge because they were not sufficiently culpable. Finally, 
the determination that the claimant was at fault in creating an 
overpayment is not reasonable or rational. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE THAT THE CLAIMANT INTENDED TO REMOVE THE 
EMPLOYER'S PROPERTY WITHOUT PERMISSION. 
The evidence supporting the finding that the claimant intended 
to remove the plants from the employer's property is weak. And it 
relies entirely on the testimony of Mr. Stoner, since Mr. Box, 
claimant's supervisor, did not see where the plants were and did 
not hear the claimant purportedly initially denying knowledge of 
their whereabouts (Tr. 24). Though Stoner stated that the claimant 
initially said "I don't know anything about any plants" (Tr. 26) 
and that the plants were "underneath a bush" (Id.), it is clear 
that he had already assumed that the claimant was stealing the 
plants when he ran to the front of the property. It should also be 
noted that the claimant was not charged with a crime, and that 
initially the employer claimed that the claimant violated company 
policy (Tr. 6, 11), and yet failed to introduce any such policy 
into evidence. 
The claimant testified that he did not deny knowing where the 
plants were and that they were clearly visible (Tr. 31-32). He 
denied that he intended to take them without permission, and had 
in fact set them down on the employer's property and was attempting 
to enter the building (Id.). A reasonable inference is that he was 
in fact going to seek permission to take the plants. If he wanted 
to steal them it would have been more reasonable to take them 
directly to his car. It is also difficult to believe that he was 
being as secretive as the employer claimed about four virtually 
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worthless plants that had been sitting for two months and 
apparently were not going to be used* Even if he did initially 
feign lack of knowledge of their whereabouts, this is 
understandable given his being confronted by the head of security 
while looking for a maintenance worker. The conclusion that the 
claimant intended to steal the plants is not reasonable given the 
evidence as a whole. 
POINT II. THE EMPLOYER DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW 
JUST CAUSE FOR DISCHARGE. 
In order for there to be just cause for discharge separation 
must be necessary due to the actual or potential harm to the 
employer. Utah Administrative Code § 475-5b-101. The employee must 
have conducted himself with a sufficient degree of callousness, 
misbehavior, or lack of consideration that the employer was 
justified in firing him. Id. Not every cause for discharge provides 
a basis to deny benefits. Id. 
In order for just cause to be shown the employer has the 
burden of proof to show that the claimant's actions were 
sufficiently culpable. The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests. Id. at § R475-5b-102 1. a. If the conduct was an 
isolated incident of poor judgment and there is no expectation that 
the conduct will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not 
be shown and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. Id. Where the employee has historically complied with 
work rules, a single violation, even if harmful, does not require 
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discharge. Id. 
In this case the employer suffered little or no harm from the 
claimant's actions. The plants were worth virtually nothing, and 
they had been sitting all summer and were unlikely to be used, the 
claimant did not actually steal them. He moved them from one 
location to another on the employer's property. He had historically 
complied with the work irules and there was no evidence of any 
problems with his performance. Even if he should have asked 
permission before moving the plants, this hardly constitutes more 
than an isolated error of poor judgment. 
It is instructive to compare the degree of culpability in this 
case with other cases interpreting these rules. In Kehl v. Board 
of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), a one-time violation of 
safety rules was culpable conduct because of the extreme potential 
harm to the employer's interests. The claimant violated rules 
dealing with transporting explosives across a railroad track. Less 
potentially damaging behavior has always been found not to be 
culpable. In Lane v. Board of Review, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 1986), the 
claimant violated state law by selling beer to a minor. This was 
held to not be culpable conduct because it was an isolated error 
of poor judgment. In Wright's Furniture Mill v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 707 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985), the claimant was a 
truck driver who was arrested on a DUI violation which made him 
uninsurable. This was held to not be culpable conduct. In Spartan 
AMC/Jeep v. Board of Review, 709 P.2d 395 (Utah 1985), the 
claimant's actions were held not to be culpable even though he 
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purportedly admitted taking some antifreeze and cabinet doors for 
his own use without permission as well as failing a polygraph 
examination regarding other thefts. Claimant's actions are 
significantly less severe than the nonculpable actions of these 
other claimants. 
The administrative law judge and the Board of Review also 
relied on the purported erosion of trust and confidence in the 
claimant to perform his job, which involved handling money. 
However, it is difficult to see how such an erosion was the fault 
of the claimant or why it is especially relevant. In Dept. of the 
Air Force v. Dept. of Employment Security. 125 Utah Adv* Rep. 54 
(Ct. App. 1990)
 f the claimant admitted to selling cocaine. He was 
not charged with a crime because he cooperated with authorities. 
Here trust and confidence had surely "eroded", and the claimant 
violated specific rules of the employer. The issue was whether 
there was actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests, and whether it was necessary to discharge the employee 
to protect those interests. Neither of these requirements are met 
in the case at bar, even if it is affirmed as a finding of fact 
that the appellant intended to remove the four plants for his own 
use without permission. 
POINT III. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CLAIMANT WAS AT FAULT IN 
CREATING AN OVERPAYMENT IS NEITHER REASONABLE 
NOR RATIONAL. 
The administrative law judge held that the claimant was at 
fault in creating an overpayment because he provided false 
information as to his intention to take the plants without 
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permission. The Board of Review failed to address this issue (see 
Tr. 60-62), even though it was raised on appeal (Tr. 51). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-6 requires that the claimant be at fault 
in the creation of his overpayment. Messersmith v. Board of Review, 
36 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (1986). On his statement of job discharge the 
claimant stated that he was fired for taking some plants (Tr. 2), 
that it was for "taking property not belonging to me (Tr. 3). The 
claimant's longer statements list the facts in accurate detail (Tr. 
5, 7-9). The Department granted benefits because there was no theft 
(Tr. 9), and not due to any inaccurate information from the 
claimant. Therefore, the claimant was not at fault in the creation 
of an overpayment. 
If this court rules that the finding of fact concerning the 
claimant's intent is not supported by substantial evidence, then 
there is no evidence of a false statement by the claimant, and thus 
no fault in the creation of an overpayment. If this court finds for 
other reasons that the employer has not met its burden of proof to 
show just cause for discharge, then even if there was a false 
statement it would not be material. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department of Employment Security's finding of fact that 
the appellant intended to steal some plants from his employer is 
not supported by substantial evidence. This, in itself, means that 
the employer failed to meet its burden of proof to show just cause 
for discharge. For other reasons the administrative law judge and 
the Board of Review misapplied the law concerning just cause 
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discharge and fault overpayment to the pertinent facts in the case. 
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that this court reverse 
the decisions of the Department of Employment Security holding that 
the appellant was discharged for just cause and that he was at 
fault in the creation of an overpayment. 
DATED this / ^  day of 3u/t< , 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Bys WARD' 
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